Hackers Steal Us Bank, Irs And Social Security Login Credentials From Infected Computers
A Russian-speaking cybercrime operation has been stealing logins for US banks, the IRS and Social Security from infected Windows PCs. The victims were ordinary people. Many used a password manager and multi-factor authentication (MFA), and it did not help.
The attackers did not break into any bank or government agency. They went after the victim’s own computer, where saved passwords, cookies and password vaults sit in one place.
At least 57 US victims had a bank or government login in the stolen data. At least 46 had an ID.me, Login.gov, IRS or Social Security account.
Researchers at Hunt.io found the operation through an exposed open directory on a server in the Netherlands. The folder held the attackers’ stolen data, scripts and logs, and it showed that 603 infected computers were reporting to the group’s servers.
Hackers Steal US Bank, IRS and Social Security Login Credentials
The attackers began with a small Python file that runs quietly in the background on Windows. Hunt.io says it was delivered by phishing, though it did not give the exact lure.
Once it was running, the infected PC checked in with the attackers’ servers, and they sent more tools based on what the victim had stored.
The first target was the web browser. The attackers broke the encryption Chrome and Edge use to protect saved passwords. Their scripts carried built-in keys that unlocked the stolen browser files later, away from the victim’s PC.
Hunt.io counted at least 3,345 decrypted logins from 16 victims, along with 30 cookie databases. Cookies matter because they prove a user has already signed in.
When an attacker copies one, the website may treat the attacker as the real user. This is how session cookie theft leads to account takeovers even when MFA is turned on.
In this case the attackers replayed stolen Microsoft 365 cookies to get live access tokens without a password or MFA prompt.
Password managers did not stop them either. One victim lost an entire LastPass vault with 2,880 logins, including Chase, Wells Fargo, IRS.gov, Medicare and PayPal.
Criminals have long cracking weak master passwords offline in stolen vaults. Here the group instead decrypted the vault data straight from the victim’s browser files.
They also guessed the master passwords of two 1Password users and copied a KeePass database from a developer’s computer.
The stolen data pointed to major US banks. Chase appeared in 31 victims’ data, Capital One in 20, Citi in 17 and Wells Fargo in 15. The ID.me and Login.gov accounts are the most worrying part, because those services open the door to the IRS, Social Security and the VA.
Wider Theft and the Attackers’ Hidden Setup
The group did not stop at banks. Hunt.io found 6,570 cryptocurrency records from 67 victims, covering 44 platforms such as Binance, Coinbase, MetaMask and Kraken.
The attackers also went after login tokens from 35 AI tools, including Claude, Codex and Gemini. These tokens can expose chat history, project files and API keys.
To keep access after a cleanup, the attackers installed legitimate remote-management tools, Level.io and ScreenConnect. Because these are real business products, they can slip past some security filters.
The setup was built to stay hidden. One server ran three control systems, named HavoX, Phantom53 and Kraken Bridge. Twelve Cloudflare Workers domains sat in front of them, so victim traffic looked like normal web traffic.
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Hunt.io says the system handled more than 1.2 million check-in messages over about three weeks. This kind of theft often ends in resale. Stolen logs can show up in an AI-powered marketplace selling infected computers. Hunt.io did not report a sale in this case.
Its evidence of who is behind the operation is the Russian-language text in the attackers’ own files. It found that text across 249 scripts and logs.
Home users who think a PC may be infected should use a clean device to change passwords, starting with email and banking. They should also sign out of every active session. Passwords alone are not enough, because a stolen session can stay valid after a reset.
Security teams should watch for pythonw.exe running .pyw files from the AppData\Roaming folder, which is where these implants live.
They should also block the listed domains and IPs. Hunt.io also advises binding sessions to compliant devices, keeping token lifetimes short and treating AI tool login files like SSH keys.
Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-
| Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IP | 145.63.138[.]67 | Main control and loot server (Podaon SIA, AS211381, Netherlands) |
| IP | 66.165.246[.]77 | Second data-theft endpoint (Hivelocity, AS29802, US), port 11603 |
| IP | 146.70.24[.]172 | External Kraken panel |
| Domain | sync-node-serv[.]com | One-time task download links (:8080/t/[token]) |
| Port | 8000 | HavoX control server |
| Port | 8080 | Phantom53 admin panel |
| Port | 8082 | Large archive upload receiver |
| Port | 8124 | Exposed open directory |
| Port | 8125 | Main loot upload receiver |
| Port | 8126 | revsocks SOCKS5 proxy posing as AkamaiNetStorage |
| File path | AppData\Roaming[hex][hex].pyw | HavoX implant path |
| File path | /opt/havox/data/loot/ | Server-side loot storage |
| File path | /opt/phantom53/data/c2.sqlite3 | Phantom53 task database |
| BuildID | 4444444 | HavoX build identifier |
| MagicValue | 0xdeadbeef | HavoX handshake value |
| CF Workers | 3k7d7v5hn.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | bog1hav1ged3-1jtn.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | busykifukek2-8psk.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | fep0bupuhag2-o0kk.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | fypahedupal2-0maz.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | j1nanyd1jot2-lwml.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | l0mad1fugiv2-7mtj.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | nelol0k0tys3-jbne.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | sekolonozus3-erij.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | tej0kygaj0g3-tad7.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | vajowigus0p3-yw4k.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
| CF Workers | zetogebuw1s2-5hzu.workers[.]dev | C2 front |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms sQuch as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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