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Prabowo And Xi: A Strategic Reset – Oped

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Key Takeaways:

  • Prabowo and Xi will meet in Shenzhen on November 20, 2026, during the APEC summit to deepen economic ties while Prabowo seeks interdependence rather than dependence, preserving Indonesia’s sovereignty and regional leadership.
  • Indonesia-China trade reached about US$154.58 billion in 2025, with a US$20.5 billion Indonesian deficit, and CEPA talks will target better market access plus Chinese investment and technology transfer in EVs, batteries, minerals, and renewables.
  • A successful outcome would demonstrate strategic autonomy through diversified partners, managed maritime issues like the North Natuna Sea, and support for ASEAN centrality without compromising Indonesia’s independent foreign policy.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and Chinese President Xi Jinping are set to hold a meeting in Shenzhen on November 20, 2026, coinciding with the APEC summit. Relations between Indonesia and China have recently been portrayed by the world’s media against the backdrop of the escalating global geopolitical confrontation, as well as the rapid changes and challenges facing the global economy. As Indonesia’s largest trading partner, China’s economy is closely interrelated with that of Indonesia, while Indonesia’s potential and strategic location in Southeast Asia make it an important country in the region.

Of course, Prabowo has a bigger task, i.e., to build interdependence that is not equal to dependence. Thus, he must seek the greatest economic benefits while at the same time preserving Indonesia’s foreign policy independence and national sovereignty, as well as upgrading Indonesia’s leadership in the region. His success will be measured not by impressive diplomatic gestures and declarations, but by how fair and sustainable the resulting framework of cooperation is.

Economic cooperation between both parties will likely receive much focus. Indonesia’s trade with China includes infrastructure projects, manufacturing, and industrial cooperation, which have already shown big potential. Total trade between Indonesia and China in 2025 reached approximately US$154.58 billion. The country’s exports to China totalled US$67.04 billion while its imports from the nation reached US$87.54 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of about US$20.5 billion for Indonesia.

As part of the CEPA negotiations, Indonesia should push for better market access to agricultural products, fishery products, processed minerals, and manufactured products, and enable the participation of small- to medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain of Chinese companies. Indonesian companies can reap bigger benefits from investment from Chinese companies in the fields of electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy, critical minerals, and digital technology. Indonesian companies can benefit from transfer of technology, creation of employment, and environmental responsibility and participation of local companies. If these are not achieved, Indonesia will risk being flooded by foreign capital and technology while only engaged in low-value-added production.

Negotiating for CEPA should also be seen as trying to develop the Indonesian economy by utilizing foreign capital and technology. This does not mean that we have to increase trade volume in order to develop our economy. We have to identify where Chinese capital and technology can add value to our economy and increase our production capacity in order to move up the value chain and become more competitive.

The economic aspect of cooperation between both parties should also not be separated from existing geopolitical competition. China’s maritime claim in the area versus Indonesia’s sovereignty in the North Natuna Sea is a sensitive issue. However, although Indonesia is not a party to the island dispute, it has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that could be vulnerable to overlapping with other countries’ EEZs, including China’s. The two parties should hold frequent consultations between relevant maritime authorities to prevent any naval incident. Such dialogue does not necessarily compromise either side’s sovereignty.

Dealing with rivalry between the US and China, Indonesia can continue to adhere to its Bebas and Aktif foreign policy and maintain good relations with Washington and other major countries, including Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, New Delhi, and the Europeans. While boosting relations with Beijing, President Prabowo must be careful not to allow ties with China to come at the expense of his country’s other major international relations. The countries, apart from China, can provide Jakarta with alternative sources of investment, technologies, markets, and even defense cooperation. By diversifying relations with major countries of the world, Indonesia will be able to bargain better with each of them.

In terms of the regional aspect, Indonesia must make sure that the cooperation between Indonesia and China is able to support regional stability and the unity of ASEAN as the biggest influential country in the organization. Hence, Indonesia must encourage China to complete a substantive South China Sea Code of Conduct and other initiatives in order to enhance regional cooperation such as in the areas of renewable energy, food, digital economy, maritime connectivity, and sustainable infrastructure. In this context, Chinese investment in regional supply chains can be beneficial for Southeast Asia’s development and still be supportive of ASEAN centrality.

Structuring these objectives into successful negotiations requires the Indonesian government to identify and establish concrete targets, particularly in relation to CEPA efforts aimed at securing better market access and quality investment, as well as technology transfer to create employment at home. Importantly, Indonesia also needs to improve the current frameworks to manage its maritime disputes with China, diversify its partnerships, and link the current bilateral framework with the economic and security agenda of ASEAN.

So long as their respective interests remain non-identical, there is much scope for a more mature relationship between Prabowo and Xi Jinping. While Beijing will be eager to project a stable bilateral relationship with a major player in Southeast Asia, Jakarta needs more than just investment and trade to accelerate its economic development. A fruitful meeting between the two leaders in Shenzhen could provide much proof that, even as Indonesia adopts a strategic interdependence with another major power, it does so without relinquishing its precious strategic autonomy. That will be the real substance of a strategic ‘reset’.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

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