7 Experts On The Risk Of A Wider War With Iran 

Once again, the United States is on the precipice of war with Iran. But this time might be different.

In the eight months since the Trump administration bombed Iranian nuclear sites, the world has changed, and President Donald Trump seems emboldened. He faced little blowback after his previous attack on Iran, and he’s riding high after snatching Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela.

Now Trump is amping up the pressure on Tehran to give up its nuclear program by deploying a huge collection of fighter jets and warships to the Middle East, not seen since the Iraq War. If negotiations fail, Trump is threatening a massive attack, with the pursuit of regime change a possibility.

Last year,we asked a series of experts to weigh in on how an attack on Iran might unfold. We’ve gone back to them to see what they think of Trump’s latest moves, the potential rewards or risks of military action and how their own views may have changed based on what happened last time.

Their general consensus: Trump may be about to take risks that are far less predictable — and far more deadly — than his previous gambits to reshape the globe.

‘There will not be a “TACO” this time’

BY RYAN CROCKER

Ryan Crocker is a distinguished chair in diplomacy and security at RAND, and he was a career Foreign Service Officer who served six times as an American ambassador to: Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon.

It is highly unlikely that Iran will meet U.S. demands on zero enrichment, ballistic missiles and/or support for proxy forces. Tehran sees these as crucial underpinnings of regime legitimacy; to meet Washington’s conditions would effectively mean the end of the Islamic Republic.

The massive buildup of U.S. forces cannot be sustained indefinitely. There will not be a “TACO” (Trump Always Chickens Out) this time — in the absence of an agreement, President Donald Trump will take action, probably limited in the first instance, in an effort to coerce Iran into an agreement. When that doesn’t work, and it won’t, Trump will expand operations in an effort to decapitate the regime, including clerical and military leadership. That will require precise intelligence, which may be harder to obtain than it was in June.

It is important that initial strikes comprehensively target Iran’s missile capabilities. If Iran can, they will use them against U.S. allies and assets in the region, as well as Israel. What Trump will not do is commit U.S. ground forces. In the event of regime decapitation, this means the U.S. will have no ability to control subsequent events. It is impossible to predict what will happen next. What we can say with confidence is that we will not see the emergence of a secular democracy led by the son of the Shah. Far more likely would be the seizure of power by a group of unknown military officers and massive internal violence.

‘President Trump… operates without either clear objectives or strategy’

BY JONATHAN PANIKOFF

Jonathan Panikoff is director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East on the National Intelligence Council.

President Donald Trump correctly learned that military action can work — but may have overlearned how much and how often. It is probably not only the June strikes that increased President Trump’s confidence in his ability to attack Iran with limited blowback, but his killing in January 2020 of Iranian Qods Force chief Qassem Soleimani, as well as the military action he took in Venezuela and success there. The U.S. is not going to be able to rendition the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in the same way. And strikes always carry severe risks, including the potential that this is the time Iran finally decides the regime’s survival is at stake — always its singular overriding goal.

But without clear goals for what the strikes are meant to achieve, there is no broader strategy to determine which risks are worth taking. If Tehran determines the regime is at risk, then the response may be extensive and include not just ballistic missile strikes on Israel or U.S. bases and personnel in the region, but potentially asymmetric attacks, both terrorist and cyber, across the globe as well.

The problem is that the president’s own words, “help is on the way,” have put him in a box, making the lack of a clear strategy a potential lesser risk than not striking and keeping his word. If he doesn’t, it will embolden the Iranian regime further, which would be skeptical of the president’s future threats, undermining U.S. deterrence. Moreover, it would reinforce the view of many Arab states that are already negative toward U.S. reliability and the value of President Trump’s word, a notion that Beijing and Moscow would almost certainly latch onto as well.

Neither protests nor airstrikes alone are likely to end the regime’s grip on power. History suggests it will require either the varying Iranian security forces to stand aside, as happened in 1979, or at least a part of the security establishment to switch sides to the opposition.

What we all should have learned by now is that President Trump, more than many of his predecessors, operates without either clear objectives or a strategy. That can create opportunities for the U.S. and its allies where they didn’t previously exist, and perhaps U.S. airstrikes, in addition to further diminishing Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear problem, will bring tens of thousands back to the street. But it also poses the risk that, for the first time, the president’s actions vis-à-vis Iran won’t actually lead to the result he expects and could prompt significantly greater threats to Israel, Gulf allies and U.S. personnel in the region.

‘Effectively playing a game of chicken’

BY DENNIS ROSS

Ambassador Dennis Ross is the William Davidson distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former U.S. special envoy to the Middle East; his latest book is Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World.

Before President Donald Trump launched his strikes against the Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan nuclear sites — the most important Iranian nuclear infrastructure — I predicted that if he attacked only in a limited way, the conflict would be contained. But if the attack was wider and seen as being about regime change, it would escalate and not be containable. Though we attacked all three sites, Trump’s intent was limited to the nuclear program, and the Iranians responded much the way they had to the killing of Qassem Soleimani: They signaled what they would do in advance of attacking al Udeid base, letting us limit the damage and conveying they had no interest in escalation. So, is that the lesson that President Trump has learned: You can use force in a limited way for a limited objective and Iran will respond in kind?

The fact that the president is apparently now speaking about a more limited strike to try to produce a deal — and only if that fails might he then consider a much larger one intended to produce regime collapse — suggests the following: First, he thinks that he can use limited force for coercive purposes to achieve a deal and that the Iranians have an interest in keeping the conflict limited. Second, that if he cannot achieve a nuclear deal — which seems to be his preoccupation even if others talk about ballistic missiles, support for proxies and treatment of Iran’s citizens — he will raise the ante, but much later.

The problem is that the Iranians now seem to feel that Trump can be deterred by their threats to attack U.S. forces, interests and friends throughout the region. They read him as wanting only a limited conflict and they are threatening a much wider one. Apart from the mismatch in perceptions, there is an irony: Neither side actually wants a wider war. Trump doesn’t want a war that escalates, could be hard to stop and could produce a huge leap in oil prices when he already has to deal with the affordability crisis in this country. But the Iranians, for all their bluster, know they are profoundly vulnerable with little or no air defense, and with the risk that their forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and related control mechanisms of their public, could be dramatically weakened by a war that escalates. With a public they know is extremely angry, this is not the time to weaken the regime further. So neither may want a wider war with escalation that can take on a life of its own, but each reads the other as willing to back down on their red-lines, believe it is very costly for them to back down on their own, and are effectively playing a game of chicken.

For President Trump it comes back to understanding his objective. I may be wrong, but I still think he defines it more narrowly: Iran doesn’t rebuild its nuclear infrastructure and program and effectively gives up its pursuit of nuclear weapons in a way that is unmistakable. For Ayatollah Ali Khamenei et al., is that outcome seen as such a sign of regime weakness that it is a threat to the regime? Or is it possible that there are those around the Supreme Leader who can prevail upon him to look for a way out, given the danger of a war with the U.S. to the survival of the regime? That happened in 1988 with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when Mir Hossein Mousavi and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani persuaded him that the risk of escalation with the U.S. threatened the survival of the regime, and he needed to end the war with Iraq. The real question now is whether, as in 1988, regime survival will once again trump revolutionary defiance.

‘We may yet find ourselves in a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation’

BY RAY TAKEYH

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Trump administration was a late entry into the June War. Once Israel began to dominate Iran’s skyline and attack its nuclear facilities and kill scores of its generals with relative impunity, President Donald Trump inched his way into the conflict. First, he boasted that the Israeli success was caused by American weapons, and then he joined the war and took credit for its outcome. He promised that Iran’s nuclear program was obliterated.

And then came America’s snatching of President Nicolás Maduro from his palace in Venezuela. Trump, who relishes displays of power, seems to enjoy bombing recalcitrant adversaries, as long as there is no cost. Trump’s demand is for Iran to declare that it will never enrich uranium at home. In the midst of all the military deployments in the Persian Gulf, the fact that is neglected is that zero-enrichment is Iran’s practical condition today. The bombed nuclear facilities remain under rubble, and there is no evidence that Iran is surreptitiously enriching uranium anywhere. In essence, Trump is proposing to bomb Iran to get a declaration from a regime that he and many in the Republican Party have long insisted is not to be believed.

Wars have their own dynamics that are impossible to predict ahead of time. As Vietnam-era diplomat George Ball warned Lyndon Johnson, “Once on the tiger’s back, we cannot be sure of picking the place to dismount.” America may bomb Iran, and it may get away with it. The Islamic Republic is weak, its defenses battered and its population restive. But the mullahs may retaliate and, in the process, they may kill American servicemen, thus mandating more American bombing. We may yet find ourselves in a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation, otherwise, on the tiger’s back.

Seldom has a military operation lacked coherent strategic objectives or a concise explanation as the prospective attack on Iran. In another era, Congress would be demanding an explanation from the administration and a measure of accountability. American people should demand no less.

‘Iranian leaders would ultimately prefer deal-making to a broader war’

BY ARASH AZIZI

Arash Azizi is a contributing writer at The Atlantic and author of What Iranians Want: Women, Life, Freedom.

President Donald Trump might have concluded from the 12 Day War that decisive military action can bring a swift end to a conflict and that, faced with overwhelming American military might, there is little that Iran can do. As is often the case, too much hubris can be dangerous because, under certain conditions, Iranians might end up broadening the conflict, knowing full well Trump's aversion to that scenario. They could, for instance, strike Israel, infrastructure in hubs such as Dubai and U.S. bases in the region, causing significant instability. Iran will suffer grave consequences if it picks this path, but those Iranian military leaders who could lead such a campaign might still reasonably hope to be in a better position at the end of it. They might even use this to pave their own path to power.

Last year, I said that the Iranian leaders would ultimately prefer deal-making to a broader war in the region. I still think the same. Under the right conditions, elements in Iran might seize the opportunity for a new deal with the U.S. and perhaps even bring about a Venezuela-like regime transformation in the country. But there nevertheless exist dangers of a broadened conflict, even if neither side truly wants it.

‘The majority of Americans oppose a U.S. military campaign against Iran’

BY ROBIN WRIGHT

Robin Wright is a foreign affairs analyst who has written multiple books on the Middle East, including Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World.

Much of what all of us wrote last year may be even truer today. Alas.

President Donald Trump either does not fathom the growing domestic and international opposition to a war with Iran, or he is making facile assumptions about how it might play out afterwards. Before the 12 Day War last year, Trump called for “unconditional surrender.” This time around, on February 13, he said a change in power “would be the best thing that could happen” in Iran. While the theocracy is clearly no longer sustainable long-term, Trump has not yet made a single clear-eyed case about who or what might come next. The previous four administrations made historic blunders — costly in thousands of American lives and trillions from the national treasury — in their calculations about Afghanistan and Iraq. If all Trump wants is a new nuclear deal, that means the current government remains in power. Then what?

I, for one, remain bewildered. Others seem confused, too. The majority of Americans oppose a U.S. military campaign against Iran under the current circumstances, according to a poll last month. Dozens of members of Congress, from both parties, have publicly warned in recent weeks that the White House does not have the legal authority to engage in a new war without getting congressional approval. Much of the world, including powerful players in the Middle East, is wary too. Britain, which participated in the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is refusing to allow U.S. warplanes to use its military bases for air strikes on Iran.

Implicitly or explicitly, Washington backed opposition movements during the Arab uprisings launched in 2011. The autocratic leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen — who had collectively ruled for 123 years — were ousted. There are lessons here, too. Some of the leaders democratically elected in Tunisia are now in jail. The current Egyptian government is more brutal than the one ousted in 2011. Libya is hopelessly divided between two rival governments. And poor Yemen: The autocrats in those countries did not deserve to hold on to power. The protesters in those countries and in Iran today, facing such brutality, have inspired us all. The Middle East has consistently been the world’s most volatile region for 78 years. More than ever, all the arms of power in Washington need to be careful not to mess up whatever they opt to do next.

‘Trump is more confident about military strikes in Iran this time around’

BY IAN BREMMER

Ian Bremmer is president and founder of the Eurasia Group.

President Donald Trump is more confident about military strikes in Iran this time around — both on the back of his experience at the end of his first term (after the killing of Qassem Soleimani) and the 12 Day War last year, as well as given the success of his military operation in Venezuela last month.

I see the risks of limited action as comparatively low, since Israel has established escalation dominance in the region (against Iran's proxies) and the regime is not under imminent threat in its domestic environment. But a broader decapitation threat is another matter, and there I could see attacks against U.S. military targets in the region, as well as critical energy infrastructure, and disrupting the Strait of Hormuz (with significant implications for oil prices) as more plausible.

All of which is why a more limited set of strikes, at least to begin with, seems the more likely option to me at this point. Yes, Iran hasn't offered much in terms of their negotiations, but there's no reason not to test that after having once again pushed back their nuclear capabilities and targeted ballistic missile capacity (that they're not yet willing to negotiate about).