7 Practical Ways To Protect The Midterms Right Now

Free and fair elections are a powerful tool of democracy, even in a backsliding democracy… just ask Viktor Orbán.

That’s why there’s growing concern across the political spectrum about protecting the integrity of this fall’s midterm elections in the United States. The issue has been politicized, with Democrats and Republicans seeing different electoral threats. The current impasse in Congress over the SAVE America Actand President Donald Trump’s executive order restricting mail-in voting are only the latest signs that politicians aren’t on the same page.

So POLITICO Magazine reached out to non-partisan voting experts with a simple but urgent question: What is one concrete, realistic step that should be taken now to protect the midterm elections?

Our experts proposed a mix of technical fixes, policy changes and public communication strategies, and most of them don’t need help from Congress or the president — they are things that state and local officials can be doing right now to ensure that November’s voting is seen as legitimate by all parties. Some of them might surprise you.

Here are their suggestions.

Who: State election officials and legislators

How: Review and reinstate deadlines immediately

BY EDWARD B. FOLEY

Edward B. Foley is a professor of law at the Ohio State University.

Timing is everything for this year’s midterms. Congress will convene on January 3 to swear in the election’s winners. If states haven’t wrapped up all their procedures for certifying the winners by that date, it could enable either of the political parties to unfairly keep control of the House of Representatives by refusing to seat members whose states don’t certify their victories until after that date.

To avoid this, it is essential that states do whatever it takes to complete all of their necessary procedures for certifying the results of their House elections — including any recounts and litigation — before January 3. The details of these procedures differ from state to state, but some general points apply.

First, the chief elections officer in each state should conduct a review of their state’s laws and deadlines, as well as past disputed elections, to assess the vulnerability of an election remaining uncertified on January 3. Where those vulnerabilities exist, the state legislature should tighten the timetable, and if new legislation is not possible, then election administrators should determine what they can do to shorten the schedule. Many states give more time than is necessary to canvas election returns; they can speed up this canvassing by several precious days. Many states also wait till the completion of canvassing before triggering an automatic recount, but recounts can be started administratively before the law requires — and thus completed earlier.

The most significant source of delay is potential litigation. It is incumbent on all judges, state and federal, that cases concerning House elections receive expedited procedures. No judicial order should be issued in any pending case without considering in advance how the entire litigation can end before January 3. Courts should be especially wary of temporarily blocking administrative certification of an election outcome unless judicial proceedings are complete — given the risk that for unforeseen reasons appeals, including Supreme Court review, will remain unfinished on January 3. In this situation, justice delayed is truly justice denied.

Who: State election officials

How: Prepare a playbook for ballot seizures

BY ALEXANDRA CHANDLER

Alexandra Chandler is director of Impact Programs, Free and Fair Elections at Project Democracy. 

If the Department of Justice seizes ballots, voting machines and other election materials on election night or shortly after, that could seriously disrupt the legally required post-election processes governing the canvassing, counting, and certification of races, and potentially break chain of custody over ballots in a way that could fuel conspiracy theories and make it difficult to declare a widely accepted winner.

Election officials can and should prepare now for this scenario.

First, they need to draft clear legal contingency plans — with their counsel as well as partners, such as state attorneys general — on how they would respond. Making these decisions in advance is key to responding quickly in fast-moving, high-stress situations. They need to be prepared to be in court within minutes seeking to regain custody, which means doing all the legal research now and pre-drafting pleadings for different scenarios. If the Department of Justice were to succeed in seizing ballots, time would then be of the essence. The faster elections officials can regain lawful custody of all ballot materials and resume the counting process, the less likely it is that federal officials would be able to tamper with those records in some way. (For a good illustration of many of the legal issues at play, see the UCLA Voting Rights Project’s lawsuit in the California Supreme Court against the Riverside County Sheriff’s seizure of 650,000 ballots from the 2025 election.)

Second, election offices as a whole need to be prepared for the practical challenges of potential raids by federal law enforcement. Staff at all tabulation sites need legal training regarding not only how to comply with a warrant but also how to limit the harm of a legally dubious one, such as how to immediately contact counsel and how to ensure that federal officials do not exceed the scope of a warrant. Additionally, system redundancy will be key to protecting secure records of actual results and materials to the fullest lawful extent. The more records elections officials are able to retain about ballots and counting in progress, the more likely it is that they will be able to accurately verify results even if the chain of custody is broken.

Finally, improving tabulation speeds itself is very helpful. We've already seen attempts to spread falsehoods about the period between Election Day and when races are called, particularly in California, and research has shown that these attacks can be successful at impacting voters' trust in an election. More than ever, elections officials — as well as the policymakers who allocate funding to them — should be doing everything possible to bolster and optimize tabulation systems for the fastest possible count, as well as encouraging voters to vote early if possible. The less time it takes to canvass, count, and certify the results, the smaller the window will be for possible interference.

Who: State legislators

How: Draft legislation preventing federal election interference

BY GALEN SHEELY

Galen Sheely is the research director for the Voting Laws Roundup project at the Democracy Policy Lab in University of California, Berkeley. 

The Trump administration has suggested it could send law enforcement to the polls or in election certification processes — even though federal law prohibits the deployment of federal agents to polling places. Considering the very real crisis the administration would cause by carrying out these orders, however, it is imperative for states to provide as many protections against federal interference and avenues for holding violating federal officials accountable as possible.

State legislators can do this by enacting legislation that reinforces existing federal protections by enshrining them in state law. The Brennan Center has provided excellent model legislation on this topic, which provides a good starting point for legislators drafting legislation to prevent federal election interference and providing accountability for potential violations. The model legislation highlights several important key provisions that legislators can address in such legislation.

First, state legislation should prohibit sending troops or other federal agents to the polls except in emergencies and requested by state officials. Second, legislation should prohibit election interference by federal officials. Finally, state legislation should allow aggrieved parties or state officials to sue the government or federal agents in state court. To avoid Supremacy Clause issues — the concept that federal law takes precedence over conflicting state law — states can mimic the language of existing federal statutes and include language that applies equally to state and federal officials.

Luckily, state legislators in Virginia, Washington and California have already begun reacting to this threat. Legislators in these states should vote to enact these proposals before the midterms, and more states should follow in their footsteps and enact legislation protecting against federal interference.

Who: Candidates, members of Congress and election officials

What: Tours of election offices

BY PAUL GRONKE AND LAUREN PRATHER

Paul Gronke is director of the Elections & Voting Information Center at Reed College. Lauren Prather is co-director of the Center for Transparent and Trusted Elections at the University of California, San Diego. 

An ongoing threat to the integrity of the election system is declining trust and confidence in the integrity of our election system. Recent surveys show thattrust in elections has declined by 17 percentage points since the 2024 presidential election, and the decline has occurred across party lines. One cause of this decline is a growing tendency among politicians who have lost an election to level charges of “election rigging” or “election fraud.”

One concrete step that can be taken to reduce these actions on the part of politicians and to protect the midterm elections is for opposing candidates for state legislatures and Congress to agree to jointly attend a tour of one or more local elections offices in their district to learn how elections are administered. Extensive evidence shows thatelection tours increase trust andbreak through partisan polarization about electionadministration by educating participants about how elections are actually administered and disabusing them of false narratives. Election officialsthemselves view tours as an effective way to reach the public.

In the case of tours for candidates, the tours would serve a second purpose beyond simple education about the process: reducing the likelihood that an election loser will charge election malfeasance. Attending a tour creates a public record of candidate engagement with the election process that raises the cost of later fraud claims. Candidates who publicly engage with and express satisfaction about the integrity of the process before Election Day will find it much harder to attack that same process after they lose. Refusing to participate in a tour also sends its own signal — and that, too, becomes part of the public record.

The logistics are straightforward, the cost is minimal, and the photo op of two opposing candidates learning about election integrity together sends a powerful bipartisan signal.

Who: Court administrators, candidates and election administrators

How: Prevent a seizure of ballots ahead of time

BY RICHARD L. HASEN

Richard L. Hasen is professor of law and political science at University of California, Los Angeles and director of the Safeguarding Democracy Project.

To protect the integrity of the midterm elections, courts, states, election administrators, political parties and candidates should assure that no government authority can seize ballots before election results are finalized and before all election contests and recounts are resolved. That’s because of what’s called the “chain of custody”: local election officials ensure that all ballots that voters have cast remain in the care and custody of election officials under transparency rules giving the public the ability to observe how election officials are protecting ballots.

If a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency were able to seize ballots in a live election, it would become impossible to confirm that election’s outcome. Once the chain of custody is broken, the public cannot know if ballots were added, removed or altered. This concern is a real one, as recent seizures inFulton County, Georgia andRiverside County, California demonstrate.

What can be done to prevent a seizure of ballots in 2026? First, court administrators must educate the judges and magistrates who would handle any requests for warrants to seize ballots. Judges should be reminded that they must carefully scrutinize the evidence to look for real proof of wrongdoing before issuing an order that could irreversibly break the chain of custody.

Second, starting now, states, parties and candidates should proactively sue the United States government to obtain injunctions barring federal agents from seizing any ballots without offering the court that issued the injunction significant proof of wrongdoing. Even in the case of reliable evidence of wrongdoing, judges can order that original ballots remain in the custody of election officials, giving federal officials access but not control and preserving the chain of custody.

Finally, election administrators need to prepare to immediately seek judicial remedies and alert the public in the event there is an attempt by law enforcement to seize ballots. The consequences of seizing ballots in an ongoing election are dire, and everyone must be on guard so that seizures do not happen in live 2026 elections.

Who: Congress

How: Secure funding with the Presidential Election Campaign Fund

BY WREN OREY

Wren Orey is director of the Bipartisan Policy Center's Elections Project.

Providing stable, predictable funding would help election offices build the staffing and infrastructure necessary to consistently administer secure, accessible, and trustworthy elections. At the Bipartisan Policy Center, we recommend that Congress allocate $400 million per year for election administration. To make that happen, we recommend that Congress reconstitute the underutilized Presidential Election Campaign Fund — a voluntary “checkoff” program on federal tax returns that funds presidential campaigns—for election administration.

The PECF was originally created in 1974 to support presidential election campaigns with public financing, and yet it hasn’t been accessed by a major party presidential nominee since 2008. In recent years, Congress has begun drawing from the leftover funds to give grants to state and local election offices, but these grants have been ad hoc and inadequate. Permanently reconstituting the PECF would create a regular source of funding that election officials could count on to invest in staffing and plan ahead for big investments.

Setting up the PECF is essential because elections in the United States are chronically underfunded, even as the demands placed on election offices have grown significantly. Local officials are responsible for managing complex operations that include cybersecurity protections, voting technology, logistics, legal compliance, public communications, and the recruitment and training of thousands of temporary poll workers. At the same time, the workforce that carries out these responsibilities is under strain due to record turnover. An overworked, underfunded staff increases the likelihood of small administrative errors that, while unlikely to affect election outcomes, can still undermine public confidence in the process.

Reconstituting the PECF for election administration would maintain its original goal of bolstering trust in the electoral system while giving Americans a direct stake in the funding of their elections infrastructure.

Who: Nobody

How: Nothing

BY M.V. (TREY) HOOD III

M.V. (Trey) Hood III is a professor in the department of political science at the University of Georgia and director of the SPIA Survey Research Center. 

At this point in the election cycle, some states are already hosting primary elections, with others to follow shortly later this spring or into the summer. Even if this were not the case, it is also too late to implement any major changes for the general election this November.

Why? Major changes to a state’s electoral regime require more than a few months to put into place. One would typically want to start shortly after the close of an election cycle, working toward full implementation for the subsequent election cycle. A successful policy change rollout requires adequate training for local election officials who, in turn, must provide training for their respective poll workers. Besides the human element and depending on the changes in question, there may also be technical or logistical issues that will also need to be resolved.

Attempting to implement major changes to a jurisdiction’s election system invites the possibility that issues, some unforeseen, may arise. If this were to happen, it would damage voter confidence and, unfairly or not, possibly raise questions about the legitimacy of the outcome of the election.