9/11 And Tampa: Two Weeks That Reshaped Australian Politics

CANBERRA — September 2001 presented John Howard with both the greatest opportunity and the greatest crisis of his first five years as Australia’s prime minister.

Howard was the only foreign leader in Washington when al Qaeda attacked New York and Washington, killing nearly 3,000 people. Howard had been scheduled to address a joint session of Congress on Sept. 12 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty, which Australians regard as their security safety net. Instead, Howard found himself invoking the treaty to rally to the defense of the United States.

On the morning of Sept. 11, Howard was preparing for a media conference on a domestic issue — the collapse of a national airline — when press secretary Tony O’Leary delivered the grave news that a plane had struck one of the Twin Towers.

“I said: ‘Oh, gee, that's unfortunate.’ We thought no more about it,” Howard told POLITICO.

“Then 10 minutes later, he banged on my door and said: ‘You better turn your television set. Another plane has hit the other tower. It's no accident,’" Howard said.

Howard addressed the attack in his press conference, not knowing the Pentagon — where his wife and son were planning to visit — was the next target.

By the time the third hijacked plane struck the Pentagon, the pair were in a security bunker with Howard.

On a chaotic day, Howard recalled the Americans around him reacting in a remarkably “sensible, deliberate fashion” as he was evacuated from his hotel.

“The American security man in charge of my protection said he hadn't lost anybody yet and he didn't intend to start that day,” he said. “I and my immediate staff were taken to what could only be called a bunker under the Australian Embassy.”

Howard’s presence that day, and his actions after, further tightened the close bond between himself and President George W. Bush. Australia eventually became one of just three countries, alongside the United Kingdom and Poland, to join the initial U.S. invasion of Iraq.

But Howard insisted that while the seismic nature of the attacks was immediately obvious, the long-term implications were not.

“I'd be plucking it out of the air to say that I knew exactly what the reaction was [going to be],” he said.

“It was obvious to me that the attack had been carried out by terrorists and pretty quickly advisers around me were identifying Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda operating out of Afghanistan.

“It was very obvious to me that the Americans would retaliate and would be grateful for any help," Howard said. "They didn’t need help militarily, but gee, they appreciated that we pledged to help them immediately.”

Ten Australians died in the attacks, across both towers and in the planes that hit the North Tower and the Pentagon.

Just two weeks before the American attacks, Howard’s government had confronted a different crisis: hundreds of asylum seekers rescued from a sinking vessel and a political decision that would permanently alter Australia’s border policy.

Howard refused to allow the Norwegian ship MV Tampa, which was carrying 433 asylum seekers, to dock at the Australian territory of Christmas Island, 350 kilometers (217 miles) south of Indonesia. The asylum seekers were mostly Afghan Hazaras, who had been rescued from their capsizing boat.

Howard escalated the standoff by deploying Australian special forces. His actions fundamentally reshaped the country’s immigration policy for decades.

The Tampa affair became the foundation of the Pacific Solution: Australia’s strict model of offshore detention of asylum seekers and expensive efforts to dismantle people-smuggling rings.

The government’s initial policy justification for the event was framed in the language of border control and maritime sovereignty.

After 9/11, the language of security became a powerful justification for the migration policy and the two issues increasingly sat inside the same political frame.

Twenty-five years later, Howard insists the two should not be viewed together. “They were separate. I didn’t link the two — they were linked by the coincidence of time,” he said.

While American fears of follow-up attacks weren't realized, Islamist extremists now had a playbook. They used it to target civilians for more than a decade in such locations as Bali, London, Mumbai and — on a smaller scale — Sydney. And politicians, including Howard, used it as justification to expand their own policy crackdowns.

Two months later Howard’s victory in Australia's federal election was defined by his declaration: “We will decide who comes into this country, and the circumstances in which they come.”

Heightening tensions on immigration during that campaign, Howard government ministers also claimed that asylum seekers on a separate boat had thrown their children overboard. A Senate inquiry later found those claims — and Howard’s allegations that asylum seekers deliberately sank their own vessel — weren't supported by evidence.

Kevin Rudd's Labor government, which succeeded Howard’s in 2007, initially overturned the offshore processing policy but backed down after a wave of deaths at sea. Offshore processing remains bipartisan between Australia’s major parties.

“We were condemned at the time for being heartless and insensitive. But with the passage of time, although it is not regularly admitted, other countries have adopted the Australian approach,” Howard said.