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Is The Gop Still Reagan’s Party?

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Roger Zakheim was a 30-something staff member at the House Armed Services Committee when he went looking for a book expressly on Ronald Reagan's defense buildup. He couldn't find one.

So Zakheim, now the director of the Ronald Reagan Institute, eventually decided to write the book himself. "Peace through Strength: How Reagan's Military Buildup Won The Cold War" is deeply researched and will appeal to those who want to relive tales of SALT, "Star Wars" and the clashes between then-Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and then-Speaker Tip O’Neill.

Zakheim's book, which is out this week, is more than just a dip into '80s lore, however. It's an argument for the future. The intra-Republican debates over foreign policy, both in Reagan's 1976 and 1980 campaigns, echo today. And as the party begins to consider a future beyond President Donald Trump, Reaganites like Zakheim are already laying the ground for why the GOP should retain its internationalist soul.

This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

You wrote something the other day on X about the echoes of the 1986 midterms and the midterms that we just had here this month in America. Why do you think they’re similar, and what’s your advice for the White House as to what their reaction should be?

Well, listen, it was total — as JMart predicted, right? — this was the blue wave, tidal wave, however we’re going to characterize it. And so, people were going back saying, "Hey, what’s the historical analogy?" I like to look at historical analogies to get a better sense of what we can expect and how we should approach the future, and everybody pointed to 1974. The losses there were similar, but nobody looked at 1986.

If you look at the numbers, it was 55 seats for Democrats in the Senate and [258] seats for Democrats in the House. It’s eerily similar to what we have in 2026. And it’s not just that the numbers are similar; it’s the difference in response. In 1974, that’s the Watergate era of self-doubt and malaise, where Republicans are lost. What happens in ’86? Reagan in no way buckles under that pressure. After the midterms, he goes and speaks to his campaign staff. He says to them, "Listen, peace through strength is more than a policy. It’s a promise we’re going to keep to the American people. We’re going to continue to pursue it." He stuck with what I argue is the governing thesis of his first and second administrations.

And then within two years, what happens? On Dec. 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev comes to the U.N. General Assembly in New York City and announces that he’s going to unilaterally roll back the Red Army. Within two years, from the policy perspective, the win that Reagan promised actually begins to occur. And then what happens politically? You get George H.W. Bush as the next president.

So what’s the equivalent today? You posit that Reagan after ’86 stuck to his guns, still pursued the defense buildup and ultimately got a good result. What’s the equivalent today — sticking with the Iran war?

Winning decisively, yeah. My own view is that, yes, the Iran war impacted the midterms, of course, because oil prices were high and because we didn’t pursue a military campaign that could realize a decisive outcome. There were 39 days of armed conflict with Epic Fury and 139 days of diplomacy. What happens if we flip that?

So what does a decisive victory look like on Iran?

The regime crumbling — or accelerating the crumbling of that regime. To me, that is the natural result of the Trump administration really taking out the nuclear infrastructure. Trump’s goal, stated throughout and stated today, is that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

So you would support additional military strikes?

Absolutely. Yes, I would — to take on their capacity. I don’t think they’ve felt enough pressure, and certainly they are still in power.

I would also think there is the overall Reagan Doctrine; there’s more that can be done militarily. When you listen to Admiral [Brad] Cooper from [United States Central Command], he’s talked about how it was cut short. I don’t pretend to know what’s going on in terms of covert operations, but think about the opportunity you have with Epic Fury and Midnight Hammer. Their borders have never been more porous, the skies have never been more open, and there’s a lot more we could do to drive this. I think the regime is crumbling; I just think we need to do even more to accelerate it.

There are also reports today that Vice President JD Vance wants to restart in-person negotiations with the Iranians. Is that a bad idea?

Well, Reagan negotiated with Gorbachev. We think about Gorbachev now from the standpoint of, "Wow, here is this man who was willing to negotiate with the West and basically preside over the end of communism." They didn’t know that then. In their mind, Gorbachev could be like every premier before him. Thatcher thought there was some promise in Gorbachev.

Here’s the key point: What are you doing when you negotiate? How are you negotiating? And are you putting on the pressure in parallel with negotiations? One of the chapters in the book talks about the debate over how to use force — the Weinberger Doctrine vs. the Shultz Doctrine. Reagan really leaned more toward [George] Shultz.

What was the difference?

Weinberger wanted overpowering use of military force — which I generally subscribe to — but he was wary of using it as a tool for diplomacy. Shultz very much emphasized that he wanted the military to be a tool for diplomacy, applying that pressure to complement an outcome that favored the United States in negotiations. That was Shultz’s outlook, and I think some of that is what’s needed here, too.

You outline all the weapons that came online with the Reagan defense buildup, which brings back memories for people. But you also say that they’ve outlived their shelf life, and that there is now a need for a new defense buildup. 

Is that really in the cards given Iraq, Afghanistan, the exhaustion in this country, now Iran, the deficit we’re facing and the populism of the moment in both parties demanding more spending at home — sort of a "come home, America" feeling? It feels like in some ways today, the challenge is even more profound than what Reagan faced.

I don’t know about more profound — it’s different. The security threats and challenges we face are more profound because of the rise of China, plus nonstate actors, plus Iran, plus North Korea and the Russian war machine, which is spending 40% of its economy. We have multiple theater threats right now, so I think the case for needing strength is as strong, if not stronger, than in Reagan’s day.

Reagan had it pretty difficult economically. Interest rates were 14%, and you had a rising deficit and debt. It looks small in comparison — $200 billion — but they were freaking out over it. If you put yourself in the mindset of what was going on then, it looked pretty difficult.

Here’s the lesson of the book, which is why I end it by contrasting Reagan and [former U.K. Prime Minister Winston] Churchill. It’s one thing to build up a military once the war starts — think [then-President Abraham] Lincoln in the Civil War or [then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt] after Poland. Reagan’s lesson was learned as someone who came of age at the end of World War I and saw World War II. He said to the midshipmen at the Naval Academy in 1986: "This buildup is critical because I saw in my lifetime the people who died in the 1940s because a generation before failed to invest in strength in the 1930s." And the lesson of this book is that while there are a lot of important actors, the essential actor is the president of the United States. Under Article II commander in chief authority, it is the president who has to make the decisions for investment. Only he can do that.

Is it too late for us to catch up to the Chinese?

No, absolutely not. The question is how. We can absolutely catch up with the Chinese. Even that formulation might make President Trump bristle, because he believes we have a superior military — and in many respects we do. But to your point, numbers don’t lie. Their quantity is greater, and in some ways, the quality is as good. That’s what Reagan faced with the Soviet Union.

In the arms race — and this was a big debate between the Ted Kennedys of the world and Reagan’s team — it was never about matching them tank for tank, fighter for fighter. It was all about outperforming them in quality and in strategy. That was true then, and that’s what we’re going to have to do with the People’s Republic of China.

Take shipbuilding capacity, for example — they’ve already passed us by more than 200 times our capacity. How do we catch up with that, or do you think we don’t have to?

No, I do think we need to be able to, so a couple of things. They have the capacity, but we still have a far superior navy because of what we’re able to do operationally with aircraft carriers — they can’t compete with that — and most importantly, they cannot compete with our undersea capability. That is an advantage for us today, though the trend line is what you describe.

This is why we have to do two things. I get this from President Reagan’s approach: It’s an "and." It’s not, "do we keep carriers or go to autonomous systems?" It’s "keep the carriers and integrate autonomous systems." Trump’s budget would go a long way toward doing this; his $1.5 trillion budget would be a 40% increase. Now, I know you’re looking at me right now thinking there’s no way that gets through a Democratic Congress. Right. But he’s asking for 40% above, so if they even get partway there, it would be highly consequential.

Can we avoid a hot war with the Chinese in the next 30 years?

We can avoid anything. The question is whether it will be the sort of peace that allows us to thrive in society — not just thrive but dominate. Our generation — you and I are in the same age group — has enjoyed unprecedented peace and prosperity in this country. With what China is doing with their buildup, their ambitions and their reach, we’re going to need to compete — and compete hard.

Let me ask you about a couple of people. Do you think Vance is a Reaganite?

He certainly doesn’t advance it. He may be, but that’s not what he’s emphasizing.

Is Secretary of State Marco Rubio a Reaganite?

Marco Rubio talks about freedom a lot, and for Reagan, freedom was everything. Reagan called his military buildup "peace through strength," and he said that the military was the sheltering arm of freedom in a dangerous world. That’s the way Rubio talks.

For a long time after Reagan, there was really no debate about the Republican Party’s view of national security and America’s role in the world. They wanted to project force abroad and take a leadership role. Those assumptions that all of us had about what the party was and what it stood for do seem to be up in the air now. There seems to be a real debate about what kind of party this is going to be on national security — whether it’s going to be an interventionist party or an isolationist party. That debate will start in ’28 and play out in the 2030s.

I wouldn’t frame it the way you just did — isolationist vs. interventionist. It’s more nuanced than that. Peace through strength is fundamentally about how we posture ourselves so we don’t have to be interventionists — so we can realize the stability and security we need without combat. That’s what it’s about.

The concern from people on the left and on the right is: Is peace through strength viable, or does strength simply lead us into endless wars? We’ve had presidents in both parties talk about it that way. I think it’s very positive that President Trump is the first president to run on a peace through strength platform since President Reagan, because it says that strength deters adversaries. That was a formula for President Reagan that bridged divides over whether to be more restrained or more engaged in the world. It’s malleable and comprehensive enough that all factions can feel comfortable under that banner.

Well, you would say that the prosecution and outcome of Iraq, Afghanistan and now Iran have created difficulties for the Reaganite cause.

Iraq and Afghanistan have absolutely created difficulty because of the Iraq syndrome, just like Reagan was dealing with the Vietnam syndrome — this notion that we can’t win, or that our military isn’t worthy of support. What Reagan did and what President Trump is trying to do is make the American people and our adversaries understand that we will win.

I’m not ready to close the book on Iran. Your tone suggests it’s a loss, but I think structurally, President Trump has done something that is going to make America much stronger and safer, and actually give us more optionality in dealing with the challenges we face. We’re too close to the details right now; structurally, we have severely weakened a regime that was doing a lot of harmful things.

It does feel like the Reagan consensus is sort of at an end in terms of the underlying default position of the Republican Party on defense. 

It feels like we’ve gone back to 1976, and that in 2028 — or maybe 2032, because 2028 may just be one more Trump race — in one of those two primaries, we’re going to have ’76 all over again: Gerald Ford vs. Reagan. Ford, Henry Kissinger and détente vs. Reagan.

Absolutely. That’s coming. There are neo-Reaganites — or say, pure Reaganites — and neo-détentists. You reference ’76, and it’s a great reference because when Reagan ran for president and challenged Ford, he challenged détente. Ford after that told his staff during the campaign, "You can’t use the word détente." So it made an impact, and it was the morality in foreign policy plank that Reagan brought forward, as you know.

It’s a party with lots of different camps, and you have that debate. We do polling on this at the Reagan Institute. Reagan was big on trusting "we the people" and believed deeply that the American people wanted to win, that they were optimistic and that America could do it if we put policies in place that didn’t predetermine our limitations — which détente fundamentally did. And the American people generally are supportive of engaging in the world, backing a strong national defense, and maintaining a military that’s forward-present and protecting our interests. All these things are very popular.

Vance is basically in the Ford camp. There may not be this debate in ’28, but this debate is coming for your party. 

There’s a deeper debate, though, which is: Is America an ideal, or is America a sort of ethnic state, basically? And you hear a lot more Democrats today citing Reagan’s final speech than you do Republicans. 

Yeah, I disagree with you. I don’t see Democrats quoting him anymore. I spend a lot of time on Capitol Hill, and I spend a lot of time talking to governors and other people involved in the conservative camp. They all love Reagan; they all talk about Reagan. It starts with President Trump right now. Look who’s over President Trump’s shoulder when he’s talking about MAGA — as you know, "Make America Great Again" came from Reagan. Over the shoulder of President Trump in the Oval Office is President Reagan. So I don’t think it’s as divided or evenly divided as you’re suggesting.

Oh, I see. OK.

I really think we’re still in the majority. Our polling shows that.

Is that the case if Vance is the nominee in 2028, though, or is that a waiting-for-Ford moment?

I think Vice President Vance — like anybody seeking the nomination — needs a durable coalition. From President Trump on down, there are many in that coalition who like what President Reagan stood for, whether it’s peace through strength, winning, or talking about freedom. Now, there’s a debate over the role of government, no doubt. For Reagan, government was the problem, not the solution, and certainly there are a bunch of conservatives out there who are contesting and challenging that. All right, that’s fine — these are debates worth having. But the brand is pretty strong, and people like it.

The Reaganite brand?

Yeah, and it’s clear that the president does too.

Do you think if we were sitting here five years from now or 10 years from now, the Republican Party would look closer to the Ronald Reagan version than the AfD of Germany or the National Rally of France? Or is that a matter of real uncertainty that’s going to be litigated in the years to come?

I don’t see it going the way of the AfD. I really don’t. That’s a marginal party — it’s making some ground in Germany, but it’s still a fringe party. You still have these populist impulses, sure, but let’s remember: Pat Buchanan was not president of the United States. Our polling shows that the Buchanan outlook is, at best, 15 to 20% of the party.

Here’s what I know Republicans can get behind, conservatives can get behind and Americans can get behind: individual liberty, economic opportunity, peace through strength, American pride, and freedom and democracy. Those things are as durable, as ennobling, and as motivating for conservatives — and I think all Americans — today as they were decades ago. They’re the heart of the Republic.

On our posture in Europe, should we have a robust troop presence in Europe?

100%. Presence deters.

I worked on the Armed Services Committee during the Bush administration, Bush 43, and had successive European supreme commanders coming in and saying: "We can reduce our presence from eight brigade combat teams to four. Then from four to two." And they kept on referring to it as "manageable risk."

It was manageable risk. You know for who? Fricking Vladimir Putin. You can draw the line between reduction of presence and all of Putin's escapades. It is very clear to me that NATO presence, U.S.-forward presence is a deterrent. It doesn't invite armed conflict. And it advances our interests in very meaningful ways.

I have bad news for you: You are not going to have a slot in President Vance's Cabinet. 

You know, people change.