The World Cup’s Most Dreaded Gatecrasher Isn’t A Fan But A Drone

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colorado — Leaders from the military, law enforcement and local governments gathered this week for tabletop exercises overwhelmingly focused on one violent threat to this summer’s World Cup: unauthorized drones entering airspace above the 11 American stadium where matches will be played.

The two-day summit, held near the headquarters of U.S. Northern Command, brought together federal agencies, 11 U.S. host committees and FIFA’s security leadership in an attempt to prepare for a 48-team tournament spread across the U.S., Mexico, and Canada that will put unprecedented demands on public authorities at all levels.

The planning for drone incursions marks an evolution of perceived threats to large-scale events in the United States from the preoccupation with manned vehicle attacks and weapons of mass destruction that dominated security preparations in the years after September 11.

“We're never going to not worry about a dirty bomb,” said Miami-Dade County Sheriff Rosanna Cordero-Stutz, who participated in the planning session. “But we also recognize that there's a lot of other things that we need to worry about as well.”

Many local officials like Cordero-Stutz lack the real-world experience with drone interdiction scenarios that those at the FBI and Department of Defense do. As the federal government funds the acquisition of equipment by city, county and state authorities to track, deter and combat drones, also known as unmanned aircraft systems, the FBI is bringing local police to a facility it calls “the schoolhouse” to train them in its use.

“You can’t just give counter-UAS mitigation equipment to law enforcement that hasn’t learned how to use it yet,” said White House FIFA World Cup Task Force Andrew Giuliani, who is coordinating the federal government’s role in tournament preparations and addressed the summit.

Drone goals

Those who gathered in Colorado Springs contended with a range of potential security threats to the five-week tournament through tabletop exercises simulating a drone incursion and a natural disaster scenarios. The goal of the exercises, according to U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Gregory D. Newkirk, is to ensure federal and local processes “mesh … seamlessly” and quickly.

“What we don't want, if there's an incident,” said Newkirk, “you don't want basically everybody to look around the room and say, ‘Who's the decision maker?’”

The fear of unauthorized drones flying over World Cup stadiums is among the biggest emerging threats, one which didn’t exist when the United States last hosted the World Cup in 1994. Two years later, the summer Olympics in Atlanta was disrupted by a lone domestic terrorist, later identified by federal investigators as Eric Rudolph, who placed a bomb-filled backpack in a crowded Olympic Park, killing one person and injuring more than 100.

Such a low-tech threat has receded in the minds of World Cup planners, who instead are envisioning unmanned aircraft moving through regulated airspace into areas where tens of thousands of fans and dignitaries have gathered in stadiums or at urban fan festivals organized by host committees.

“It will take integration of the interagency, state and local government, teammates, allies and partners to ensure success,” Air Force General Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, who leads NORTHCOM, told attendees at the opening session. The command is responsible for synchronizing the Defense Department’s support to civil authorities, the mechanism that could deliver military capabilities for air defense, counter-drone operations, logistics or disaster response if cities request help.

State and local agencies have been encouraged to purchase equipment that can jam inbound drones or redirect them to their origin. Those governments are able to seek reimbursement through a federal $500 million grant program, which is available to all fifty states but being promoted for urgent deployment by jurisdictions that will host World Cup matches.

Law-enforcement officials from those areas are receiving training in the equipment’s use by FBI personnel and the bureau’s Hazard Devices School in Huntsville, Alabama. Teams from New York/New Jersey, Los Angeles and Boston have already completed training, according to Giuliani, with additional cohorts scheduled to visit through April.

“They’ve been key in putting that schoolhouse online at such a quick pace and getting the subject matter experts there who can train state and local officials so they can be ready to go to defend stadiums and FanFests,” Giuliani said in an interview with POLITICO.

A whole other ball game

While much of the planning has focused on hard security threats — from drones to summertime hurricanes that could roll through the East Coast during the tournament window — officials said the risk picture also includes softer pressure points that can quickly escalate if they go wrong.

Beyond physical security, the administration and FIFA are trying to reduce logistical friction that can turn routine travel delays or confusion into crowd stress, especially for international visitors navigating unfamiliar U.S. transit systems while moving between host cities.

Giuliani emphasized the unprecedented scale of the tournament to explain why those details matter. He compared Super Bowl viewership to the 2022 World Cup final and cited FIFA’s “over 350 million ticket requests” for what he said would amount to roughly 7 million tickets available across the U.S., Canada and Mexico.

But the security challenges, officials said, aren’t simply a bigger version of the Super Bowl.

FIFA Chief Safety and Security Officer GB Jones warned that U.S. best practices — many of them modeled on NFL events — won’t be sufficient for a monthlong international tournament marked by unfamiliar fan behavior, language barriers and a sprawling operational footprint.

“Best practices are not going to be sufficient,” Jones said, describing a move toward what he called “dynamic risk assessment,” with city-by-city and matchup-by-matchup planning and the varied dynamics of team rivalries, diaspora communities, and the rising stakes of matches over the course of the tournament.

Unlike U.S. stadium crowds dominated by repeat season-ticket holders who know where to go and when to arrive, Jones said many World Cup fans will be navigating U.S. transit and stadium operations for the first time and may arrive later, gather in different places, and communicate differently than U.S. sports crowds. “We have to rethink all of our assumptions,” he said.

Giuliani offered an example: pyrotechnics. While flares and fireworks are rife in soccer stadiums around the world, he said “that’s going to be unacceptable” in the United States. “It takes one of those to go the wrong way, and then you have the story of fans being injured, or even worse,” he said.

Cordero-Stutz said her county’s experience during the Copa América final in 2024 — which saw thousands of fans rush Hard Rock Stadium, jumping over security railings and running past police officers — sharpened local law enforcement’s urgency. “We learned some tough lessons,” she said, calling it “a blessing in disguise” that forced jurisdictions to strengthen intelligence relationships. Giuliani offered a familiar measure of success for security planners: you’ll know they did their job if no one notices them.

“Successful is if they’re not talking about any of the people that are administrators for this tournament,” he said. “If we’re talking about a great goal that Messi has scored, or Ronaldo, or a great final match, then we’ve done our job.”