Proof The Jimmy Johnson Draft Trade Chart Is Still Brilliant

Heading into the 1991 NFL draft, the Cowboys were flush with 10 draft picks in the first four rounds of the draft as the result of the Herschel Walker, Steve Walsh and other trades. With that much draft capital, the Cowboys expected to be fairly active deal-makers during the draft. At the same time, then-Cowboys head coach Jimmy Johnson and owner Jerry Jones were concerned that the team had no clear understanding of what each pick was worth.

To help out with that, Mike McCoy, a Cowboys executive and minority owner at the time, began to work on a valuation system for draft picks. McCoy looked at all the NFL draft day trades over the previous four years to better understand how NFL teams valued their draft picks. When McCoy was done, the Cowboys had their first version of the Trade Value Chart, which assigned a numerical value to each draft pick and significantly simplified the evaluation of trade proposals. Because of its origins with the Cowboys in the early 90s, the Trade Value Chart is sometimes referred to as the “Jimmy Johnson Chart.”

The Cowboys initially tried to keep McCoy’s Trade Value Chart to themselves, but a succession of Cowboys assistant coaches and other staffers took it with them as they were promoted to other teams or simply left to be elsewhere, and the chart quickly found its way into every war room in the NFL, where you can find it to this day.

But just because it’s being used broadly doesn’t mean it’s perfect. When McCoy created the chart, he merely took a snapshot of how teams had acted in the past, he wasn’t looking to create a perfect valuation for each draft pick. We know today that the chart significantly overvalues the picks at the very top of the draft, undervalues the benefit of having multiple picks, and significantly undervalues future picks (NFL rule of thumb: “gain a round by waiting a year,” i.e. a second-round pick this year is worth a first-round pick next year).

Every year as we near the draft, somebody will stand up somewhere and loudly proclaim that the old Jimmy Johnson Trade Value Chart is worthless, citing some of the reasons outlined above, but also changes to the game, or the salary cap, or the new CBA, or the new rookie wage scale, or some insider information only they are privy to, or a plethora of other reasons why the chart has long passed its sell-by date.

In theory, those may all be good reasons why the chart should not be used anymore, but in reality, the chart remains in use regardless.

And the reason for its continued use lies in its primary benefit: The Value Chart is basically a Rosetta Stone for the NFL. It allows different teams to communicate with each other about draft picks because it establishes a common valuation methodology that can be used as a reference to evaluate a trade proposal. Every team can and does supplement that initial information with their own valuation methodology. The Cowboys for example, after getting blasted for giving up value in the Travis Frederick trade-down in 2013, announced that using their own trade charts “for the most part, we either won or hit right on it.”

Without referencing the Jimmy Johnson Chart, former Patriots coach Bill Belichick explained in 2019 how a common valuation methodology helps teams communicate.

“I would say that, in general, the trades over the last several years for the most part have been, let’s call them within 5 to 10 percent, pretty equitable trades,” Belichick said.

“So, for you to have a chart that’s different than the other 31 charts isn’t really that productive because now we’re just arguing about which chart – ‘My chart says this. Your chart says that.’ . . . I would say everybody probably uses about the same value chart. I’d say in our draft trade negotiations through the years, especially the last two or three years, there hasn’t been a lot of, ‘My chart says this. Your chart says that.’ Now 10 or 15 years ago there was some of that. ‘Oh, here’s what we think it should be.’ Well, the other team’s in a different ballpark because they’re looking at a different chart. I would say that when you look at the trades now, over the past few years, a majority of them fall within what we would say is a range of a fair trade. What the going rate would be is what the team gave up and what the team got is about what you would expect them to get, whether it’s our trade or not. I’m just looking league wide.”

One way of finding out whether the Trade Value Chart is still relevant today is by looking at whether trades today still conform to the valuation proposed 35 years ago. Which is why I decided to take a look at the trades made in the top two rounds in the last three drafts to see how many of the most recent draft-day trades still fit the parameters of the Trade Value Chart.

Some caveats before we dive into the individual trades:

• I excluded all trades involving players, because I can’t quantify the value of a player using the Trade Value Chart.
• I valued all future picks with the value of the 16th pick in the next lower round.
• I’m going to consider any trade that was within plus or minus about 5% in terms trade value points gained or lost as an outright validation of the Trade Value Chart.

That leaves us with a total of 38 trades in the first two rounds of the last three drafts that involved the exchange of draft picks, and that we can perhaps draw some conclusions from. The table below provides an overview of those 38 trades, including the detail of the picks exchanged, their trade value and the trade value gained or lost in the trade by the team trading down. Trades with a value disparity of less than 5% are marked in green, trades that exceed 5% are marked in yellow.

Without any further analysis, the color coding of the table provides us with an early read on the Trade Value Chart. 29 “green” trades out of 38 trades, or about 76%, are an outright validation of Mike McCoy’s trusty value chart.

Also very relevant but less obvious: 27 trades result in a gain for the team trading down, two are a wash (0% gain/loss), and only nine show the team trading down losing value relative to the Trade Value Chart.

If the Trade Value Chart were a perfect “Law of Physics” for the NFL, every trade would result in 0% gain/loss. Since the reality shows a distribution, we can draw the following insights:

1. The “Seller’s Edge” is real but not absolute

The data shows that 74% of the time (27/38), the team moving down receives a premium. However, the average gain is only 3.5%. This suggests the Jimmy Johnson chart is remarkably resilient and accurate as a “Fair Market Value” benchmark. While the narrative often suggests teams must “massively overpay” to move up, the actual math across the last three years shows the overpayment is typically quite small.

The seller’s edge is also visible in the number of picks being traded. Teams trading down generally expect extra picks, not a swap of picks. 74% (27/38) of the trades resulted in a net gain of at least one pick for the team trading down.

2. The 2023 vs. 2024/25 shift

There is a noticeable trend in how teams are valuing picks year-over-year: six of the nine total “losses” occurred in 2023. Only three losses happened in the 2024 and 2025 drafts combined, which suggests the sellers have become much more disciplined – or it’s just a statistically irrelevant blip that’ll be corrected this year.

3. The Outliers: When the Jimmy Johnson Chart goes out the window.

The table shows nine trades (marked in yellow) that exceed 5% in draft value gained or lost. And we can cluster them into four categories that provide an interesting glimpse into a GM’s thought process.

A. Trade up (at a premium) to get ahead of an anticipated positional run

1. 2024: ARI (Down) to ATL (Up) — Pick #35

• Net Gain for Team Trading Down (ARI): +17.1%
• Player Selected: Ruke Orhorhoro (DT)
• Background: Atlanta’s GM Terry Fontenot was widely criticized by analysts for moving up for Orhorhoro. After drafting Michael Penix Jr. at #8, the Falcons were desperate to address the defensive line and made sure they got their interior defender before an anticipated run on the position (three DL were picked with the next four picks).

2. 2024: DAL (Down) to DET (Up) — Pick #24

• Net Gain for Team Trading Down (DAL): +16.9%
• Player Selected: Terrion Arnold (CB)
• Background: Terrion Arnold was a falling blue-chip prospect who many expected to go in the top 15. Detroit GM Brad Holmes is famously aggressive, and after the Eagles snagged Quinyon Mitchell at #22, he paid a premium to jump ahead of other CB-needy teams like Green Bay (#25), Tampa Bay (#26), and Detroit (#29) to catch the last blue-chip corner. Dallas happily took the overpay because they believed they could still get their guy (Tyler Guyton) at #29.

3. 2024: WAS (Down) to PHI (Up) — Pick #40

• Net Gain for Team Trading Down (WAS): +9.0%
• Player Selected: Cooper DeJean (DB)
• Background: This was a clash of philosophies. Washington’s new GM Adam Peters wanted to volume-build a depleted roster, while Philly’s Howie Roseman wanted elite traits. DeJean was a consensus first-round talent who had slid. Washington demanded a premium to let a division rival move up, and Roseman paid it to secure a player he thought shouldn’t have been there.

4. 2024: JAX (Down) to MIN (Up) — Pick #17

• Net Gain for Team Trading Down (JAX): +6.4%
• Player Selected: Dallas Turner (Edge).
• Background: Because a record-setting 14 offensive players went in the first 14 picks, the Vikings saw a Top 10 talent in Turner available at #17. They ignored the chart and threw multiple future mid-round assets at Jacksonville to get close to the top of an anticipated run on defenders (six defenders drafted in the eight picks between #15 and #22) to ensure they secured a consensus top 10 talent.

B. Chasing Traits

1. 2024: CAR (Down) to LAR (Up) — Pick #39

• Net Gain for Team Trading Down (CAR): +17.7%
• Player Selected: Braden Fiske (DT).
• Background: The Rams were determined to pair Fiske with his college teammate Jared Verse to replace Aaron Donald. Carolina exploited this specific obsession and had the Rams overpay.

2. 2025: LAR (Down) to ATL (Up) — Pick #26

• Net Gain for Team Trading Down (LAR): +8.2%
• Player Selected: James Pearce Jr. (Edge).
• Background: The Trade Chart consensus typically values a future first-rounder as a current year second-rounder. However, when a team like Atlanta believes they are one pass-rusher away from a Super Bowl (never mind that no team is ever “one player away”), they value the win-now player (Pearce Jr.) much higher than the unknown pick a year away. The Rams profited by collecting a premium future asset while only dropping 20 spots.

3. 2023: DET (Down) to KC (Up) — Pick #55

• Net Loss for Team Trading Down (DET): –10.4%
• Player Selected: Rashee Rice (WR)
• Background: KC saw a specific fit for Rashee Rice in their Mahomes-led offense – the Chiefs had just lost JuJu Smith-Schuster and fellow wide receiver Mecole Hardman in free agency – and capitalized on Detroit’s willingness to move.

C: The Strategic Rivalry or the Petty GM

4. 2023: NE (Down) to PIT (Up) — Pick #14

• Net Loss for Team Trading Down (NE): -8.7%
• Player Selected: Broderick Jones (OT)
• Background: This is one of the more famous imbalanced trades in recent years. The New York Jets (at #15) were desperate for an offensive tackle to protect Aaron Rodgers. New England’s Bill Belichick sent a below-market offer to Pittsburgh specifically to let them leapfrog the Jets and steal the last elite tackle on the board. New England lost on the chart but won by sabotaging a division rival.

D. Asset Pre-Positioning

1. 2024: HOU (Down) to MIN (Up) — Pick #23

• Net Gain for Team Trading Down (HOU): +9.8%
• Asset Recouped: 2025 2nd Round Pick.
• Background: This was a rare pre-draft trade (occurring in March). Minnesota overpaid the chart value significantly just to acquire a second first-round pick that they needed to trade into the top three for a QB (like Caleb Williams, Jayden Daniels, or Drake Maye). Houston charged Minnesota with what is effectively a 10% desperation tax, knowing the Vikings needed the #23 pick to even get a seat at the bargaining table for a top three QB. In the end, it didn’t work out for Minnesota and they had to settle for J.J. McCarthy at #10.

4. The Future Pick Valuation

We have eight trades (21%) in the table above where the team trading up offered a future pick as part of the deal. When we last did this exercise for the 2013-2015 drafts, only two of 29 trades (7%) involved a future pick, and from 2012-2013, only one of 29 trades involved a future pick. Even without knowing what happened in the years in between, this feels like an uptick in future picks being traded.

Of the eight trades in the most recent period, four closely match the Trade Value Chart, suggesting that teams to indeed adhere to the “16th pick in the next lower round” valuation model. But two show a significant gain by the team trading up, two show a significant gain by the team trading down.

This suggests that the “16th pick in the next lower round” may be the consensus valuation, but is not the universal discount rate for future picks.

• Some GM’s in win-now mode value current picks much higher than future picks
• Some GMs operate with an aggressive scouting mindset, believing that if their scouting grade on a player is significantly higher than the consensus, the chart value is irrelevant – a common fallacy where the GM ignores real-life intel on how every other team has graded the player. If a team has a first-round grade on a player who’s available in the third, that typically means 31 other teams passed on the player twice. Doesn’t mean you can’t get lucky sometimes, but there’s a high risk in ignoring the consensus.
• Some GMs with a longer-term view of the franchise are essentially acting as banks—lending a current-year high pick in exchange for a future asset that the “market” (the chart) undervalues today: next year’s first-round pick is valued at 420 points in 2026, but will be worth at least 590 points (32nd pick) in 2027, and potentially up to 3,000 points (1st pick).

5. The Opportunity Cost of moving up

The football public generally evaluates trades in two ways:

Draft Value: This is what we’ve done in this post using the Jimmy Johnson chart by assigning values to the exchanged picks and calculating the value of the trade on each side. You can also use the Chase Stuart draft chart, the Massey-Thaler curve, or any other value chart to do this. All methods allow you to immediately evaluate a trade.

Player-for-player comparison: You can also do this immediately after the draft (“Team A got the 10th-ranked player on the Big Board I’m looking at, Team B only got players #21 and #46”) but it is usually done a few years after the draft using a wide variety of metrics to compare the players each team drafted as a result of the trade.

What’s lost in these discussions are the opportunity costs for the team trading up. Bill Barnwell of ESPN explains:

When teams trade up is it opens up another hole on their roster that can’t be filled by the draft pick(s) they traded away. Those holes eventually have to be filled by trading down and acquiring additional picks, signing a free agent, or playing an undrafted free agent (or other replacement-level talent) in that same spot. If a team trades multiple picks, that’s multiple players missing from the roster.

This opportunity cost may be why we’re seeing more trades with an equal number of picks on both sides. From 2023-2025, 11 trades or 29% had an equal number of picks on both sides. In the 2013-2015 drafts that number was 4%, from 2012-2013 it was 7%.

The key takeaway here is that even in this day and age, the demise of the trusty trade value chart from Jimmy Johnson’s days has been greatly exaggerated.

Ultimately, a trade is the result of a negotiation between two teams, and reflects the value each team places on the picks being traded, the players available with those picks, and many other things, some of which we reflected on above.

There will always be trades where one team looks like a winner and another looks like a loser, and even with a system like the Trade Value Chart in place, those types of trades can always happen when one team is a little more needy than another. The real winner of the trade usually only emerges a few years later anyway, once the pick has panned out or not, and a hypothetical trade value win or loss becomes meaningless.

Overall though, it looks like the Trade Value Chart is alive and well. It is certainly not perfect, but the evidence from the last three drafts suggests that for the most part teams do tend to try to stick fairly close to it.

[If this post sounded vaguely familiar, it’s because I wrote a similar post in 2014 and again in 2016 that came up in a recent discussion in the comments section. A BTB-member reached out and asked if an update was possible. It was!]