John Schneider’s Key Offseason Decisions: Process, Results, And The Questions After 3 Games

John Schneider didn’t enter this offseason with a roster that needed to be rebuilt from the ground up. The Seahawks had just reached and won the Super Bowl. The job was to keep the team at that level.

Three games into the season, some of those decisions are starting to raise questions.

But there’s an important distinction to make when evaluating an NFL offseason: judging a decision is not the same as judging its result.

A good decision can produce a bad outcome. A questionable decision can work out. A general manager’s job isn’t to predict the future. It’s to make the best decision possible with the information available at the time, then adjust when new information arrives.

That’s the framework for looking at Schneider’s offseason. This isn’t about handing out verdicts after three games. It’s about identifying which issues look like process problems and which may be the result of injuries, circumstances or bad luck.

The $17 million Rashid Shaheed question

Seattle gave Rashid Shaheed a three-year, $51 million extension with $34 million guaranteed — an average of $17 million per season.

It’s natural to look at Kenneth Walker producing in Kansas City after signing a three-year, $43.05 million deal and wonder why Seattle didn’t use that money to keep its former running back.

But that comparison, by itself, is too simplistic.

Walker had durability concerns that played into Seattle’s decision. Tory Horton was also injured, which may have increased the perceived need for a player like Shaheed.

The bigger question is what Seattle believed Shaheed could become.

Shaheed is an explosive, dynamic player. His value as a returner and his ability to create big plays are real. In 15 games with the Seahawks, including the playoffs, Shaheed has just 24 receptions — 1.6 per game. Through three games this season, he has been targeted 12 times, catching six passes for 53 yards. Seven of those 12 targets traveled fewer than 10 yards, and Seattle is 0-for-1 on passes of 20-plus yards thrown his way.

But he had never consistently shown that he could be a true WR2 even with Klint Kubiak.

His biggest weapon is his speed, but that speed loses some of its value when Seattle isn’t using him to threaten defenses vertically. If the goal of the contract was to turn him into a WR2, that kind of usage needs to show up. His special teams production has also dropped. His punt-return average went from 16.2 yards in 2025 to 9.7 this season, although that is obviously still a three-game sample.

That doesn’t mean the contract can already be called a mistake. Shaheed’s role can change, and the season is still young. But when you evaluate the process, there is a legitimate question: What did Seattle see in Shaheed’s history that justified paying $17 million per year with the expectation that he could become a WR2?

KaVontae Turpin provides some useful context. The Cowboys returner signed a three-year deal that can reach $18 million, or up to $6 million per year. Turpin isn’t a perfect comparison because the players have different roles. But Seattle didn’t pay Shaheed $17 million per year simply to be a great returner. They paid him expecting him to provide meaningful value as a receiver, too.

That’s the expectation that needs to be evaluated.

Kenneth Walker and the danger of hindsight

It’s easy to look at what Kenneth Walker is doing in Kansas City and decide Seattle should have simply kept him.

But that would mean evaluating the decision entirely through its current result.

Walker’s talent was never really the question. The concern was whether he could stay healthy and consistently handle a larger workload. Seattle managed his usage at different points, and sharing the backfield was part of the roster construction. Now, in Kansas City, Walker is getting more responsibility and producing.

If he stays healthy throughout the season, Seattle’s decision will naturally look different. But Schneider couldn’t know that during the offseason.

That’s why it doesn’t make much sense to simply compare Shaheed’s $17 million per year to Walker’s roughly $14.35 million and argue that Seattle should have given one contract instead of the other. The point is that the result can’t be used to rewrite the process.

The bigger problem in the backfield

Seattle selected Jadarian Price with the 32nd overall pick.

Price has talent and could develop into a very good player. The question was always how prepared he was to immediately become the Seahawks’ RB1. He wasn’t coming off a history of being an established full-time starter. The pick was heavily based on what Seattle believed he could become.

That could work. The problem was the lack of a safety net behind him.

During the offseason, Seattle didn’t even know exactly when Zach Charbonnet would be available. That created a very real possibility that Price would have to carry the backfield immediately. The alternatives were George Holani and Emanuel Wilson. Neither had a track record that gave Seattle the same level of confidence as an experienced back capable of handling a significant workload.

There were ways to lower that risk. Tyler Allgeier signed with the Cardinals, while Rachaad White was another veteran option available in free agency. Neither would have guaranteed a solution, and I’m not arguing that Seattle needed to sign either one. But both had experience handling significant workloads in the NFL — something Wilson and Holani didn’t have.

And that’s the important distinction: the problem wasn’t necessarily selecting Price. It was entering the season without a more proven option behind him if he wasn’t ready. Three games into the season, his ball-security issues have made that concern more obvious. Price already has two fumbles and lost playing time during the loss to Washington.

There is still plenty of time to change that story. Charbonnet could return, Price could improve (once he returns from his own injury), and the problem could disappear.

The same issue shows up at cornerback

Seattle’s decision not to re-sign Riq Woolen and instead bring back Josh Jobe isn’t necessarily the biggest problem. Jobe improved under Mike Macdonald, so keeping him made sense. Woolen, meanwhile, may have received an offer Seattle didn’t believe fit its plans.

The bigger issue is the depth behind Jobe.

Jobe still needed to prove he could handle a larger role. Third-round pick Julian Neal was still developing. Trevon Diggs wasn’t ready to immediately take on a major role, while other options came with their own questions. Nehemiah Pritchett, who had been inconsistent in previous opportunities, has shown some better moments early this season.

But once again, the same roster-building principle appears. When you enter a season relying on internal development that hasn’t happened yet, you increase the risk, and opposing offenses will naturally look for that weakness.

That doesn’t mean Jobe can’t be a long-term starting corner. The point is that Seattle could have entered the season with more margin for error at the position.

When the process makes sense

Safety is a good example of why process and results have to be evaluated separately.

Seattle lost Coby Bryant and selected Bud Clark in the second round. Clark had experience, versatility and the playmaking traits that made him a natural candidate to fill part of the role Bryant left behind.

Then he got hurt. The result was bad, but that doesn’t automatically make the decision bad.

If Seattle identified a need after losing Bryant and believed Clark could fill it, the process can still make sense even if an injury prevented the plan from working. The same principle applies, on a smaller scale, to Dante Fowler.

Seattle didn’t draft an edge rusher to replace Boye Mafe. Instead, the team brought in Fowler as a relatively low-cost bet with a history of production. Through three games, he hasn’t provided the impact Seattle hoped for.

But there’s a difference between a low-cost bet not working and a $17 million-per-year investment failing to provide the production that justified its price. The risk was different.

The what-ifs

What if Tory Horton had been healthy? Would Seattle have given Shaheed $17 million per year?

What if Chris Johnson had been available at No. 32? Would the Seahawks have taken a cornerback and waited to address running back later?

What if Seattle had selected an edge rusher in the first round instead of Price?

There’s no way to answer those questions with certainty. And that’s exactly why an offseason evaluation shouldn’t be built entirely around what happened afterward.

What three games actually tell us

Three games aren’t enough to determine whether Schneider’s offseason decisions were right or wrong.

But they are enough to identify where the roster has been exposed.

The Shaheed contract is the clearest example. Seattle paid him not just to be a playmaker and returner, but to become a receiver capable of filling a WR2 role. So far, the production hasn’t matched that expectation.

At running back, the concern is less about Price himself and more about the lack of an experienced option who can share the workload while he develops.

At cornerback, the issue is similar. Seattle placed a significant amount of trust in internal development without a proven option ready to absorb the impact if that development didn’t happen quickly enough.

Bud Clark shows the other side of the equation. An injury can derail the result of a decision without making the underlying process wrong.

That’s why the evaluation has to continue throughout the season.

If Price continues to carry a heavy workload and the other running backs don’t provide enough, Seattle may need to look for help. If opposing offenses continue attacking the cornerbacks, the front office needs to remain open to strengthening the position. And if Shaheed can’t turn the investment into offensive production, Seattle will need to find ways to maximize what it has already committed to him.

That isn’t abandoning decisions after three games. That’s doing the job of a front office. Schneider didn’t need to build a perfect roster. He needed to keep a team that had just reached the Super Bowl competitive and minimize the risks of falling off that level.

Some decisions will work. Others won’t. And some decisions can be sound even when the eventual result isn’t what anyone expected. That’s the difference between evaluating process and evaluating results.

Three games aren’t enough to judge an offseason, but they are enough to identify which decisions deserve a closer look.